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WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? THE FUTURE 
OF CAPS ON NONECONOMIC MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE DAMAGES IN GEORGIA 
Laurin Elizabeth Nutt* 
INTRODUCTION 
“We have taken a step back. Our rates will be more expensive and 
less accessible.”1 These were the words of Chairman of the Georgia 
Senate Judiciary Committee, Preston Smith, on the day a unanimous 
Georgia Supreme Court struck down Georgia Code section 51-13-1, 
finding it unconstitutional.2 The statute limited noneconomic 
damages, including physical and emotional pain, in medical 
malpractice lawsuits to $350,000.3 The decision leaves Georgia 
susceptible to the risks associated with allowing unlimited 
noneconomic damage awards such as a decrease in the availability of 
physicians, especially for the poor and people living in rural areas, 
and delayed or denied health care.4 In Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, 
                                                                                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Georgia State University College of Law. Thanks to Dean Kelly Timmons and 
the Law Review editors for their valuable insight and suggestions. 
 1. Bill Rankin, State High Court Overturns State’s Tort Reform, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 23, 
2010, at A1. 
 2. See id. (stating medical malpractice liability insurance rates will go up because the court struck 
down the noneconomic damages cap statute for violating Georgia’s constitutional right to a jury trial for 
medical malpractice claims). 
 3. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-13-1 (2005), declared unconstitutional by Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, 
P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 2010). The Georgia Supreme Court found Georgia Code section 
51-13-1 unconstitutional in violation of the right to trial by jury set out in Georgia’s constitution because 
it takes away the jury’s ability to assign damages. Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 
S.E.2d 218, 223 (Ga. 2010). The figure of $350,000 was set after a study of the Maryland General 
Assembly found many non-frivolous, non-economic damage recoveries do not surpass this amount. 
Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 115–16 (Md. 1992). 
 4. See, e.g., Alyson M. Palmer, Court Kills Caps on Med-Mal Awards, FULTON CNTY. DAILY REP., 
Mar. 23, 2010 (quoting Medical Association of Georgia president, Gary C. Richter, who said, “this 
decision is a loss for patients concerned about physician availability”); Gov. Rick Perry, Tort Reform 
Must Be Part of Health Care Reform, WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 12, 2009, 11:00 PM), 
http://washingtonexaminer.com/op-eds/2009/08/gov-rick-perry-tort-reform-must-be-part-health-care-
reform (“Sixty percent of [Texas] counties had no pediatricians, which often meant delayed, or denied 
health care for sick children,” due to frivolous lawsuits and cost of medical malpractice insurance); 
Roger A. Rosenblatt et al., Tort Reform and the Obstetric Access Crisis—The Case of the WAMI States, 
154 W. J. MED. 693, 693 (1991) (stating changes in practice patterns due to medical malpractice 
1
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P.C. v. Nestlehutt,5 the Georgia Supreme Court ruled the damage cap 
imposed by section 51-13-1 violated the right to a jury trial found in 
the Georgia constitution, which states, “The right to trial by jury shall 
remain inviolate.”6 
Described as the “cornerstone” of Georgia’s 2005 tort reform law7 
and “the most controversial part of Senate Bill 3,”8 the provision for 
caps on noneconomic damages became the focus of legal debate in 
Georgia.9 The states are split on whether these caps are 
unconstitutional. At least eleven states have ruled the statutes 
unconstitutional for various reasons, such as violation of the right to a 
jury trial or separation of powers, while over a dozen states have 
upheld the caps.10 Interestingly, no federal caps have been enacted 
and Congress declined to include a damage cap provision in the 
recently passed Health Care Bill.11 
                                                                                                                 
severely affect poor women and women living in rural areas where providers have limited scope of 
obstetric practice). 
 5. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218. 
 6. GA. CONST. art. I, § I, para. XI(a); Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d at 221. The court determined article I, 
section I, paragraph XI(a) of the Georgia constitution encompassed medical malpractice lawsuits 
because prior to adoption of the constitution in 1798, the state recognized medical negligence claims 
since there was a common law right to jury trial for claims involving medical malpractice that included 
damages determined by the jury. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d at 223. The court further stated that the right to 
determine the amount of damages awarded is included in the right to a jury trial and requiring a court to 
reduce those damages undermines the jury’s basic function. Id. (citing Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 
P.2d 463 (Or. 1999)). 
 7. Rankin, supra note 1. 
 8. Palmer, supra note 4. 
 9. Georgia High Court Says Damages Caps Violate Right to Jury Trial: Atlanta Oculoplastic 
Surgery v. Nestlehutt, 17 No. 12 Westlaw J. Health L. 7 (2010) [hereinafter Westlaw J. Health L.] 
(stating at least thirty other states have caps on non-economic damages with similar judicial reviews). 
See generally ADVOCACY RES. CTR., AM. MED. ASS’N, CAPS ON DAMAGES (2011), available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/378/capsdamages.pdf (giving an extensive table of all 
of the states that have passed damage caps and judicially reviewed them through 2011). 
 10. See, e.g., Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d at 223 (finding cap on noneconomic damages violates the 
Georgia constitutional right to trial by jury); Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 914 (Ill. 
2010) (holding that a limit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice lawsuits violates the 
separation of powers clause in the Illinois constitution); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525, 
529 (Va. 1989) (finding once the jury has assessed damages, Virginia’s constitutional right to a jury trial 
is satisfied and a court can then apply law to the facts); Westlaw J. Health L., supra note 9. See 
generally DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, AM. MED. ASS’N, CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE CAPS ON 
NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES (2012), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/arc/arc-
constitutional-challenges-jan-2012.pdf. 
 11. Westlaw J. Health L., supra note 9 (stating a tort reform provision was left out of the Health 
Care Bill); Kevin Sack, Illinois Court Overturns Malpractice Statute, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2010, at A13 
(stating neither the House Bill nor the Senate Health Care bill included significant changes in the 
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 Reaction to the Georgia Supreme Court’s ruling has been mixed.12 
For example, R. Adam Malone, attorney for the plaintiff in 
Nestlehutt, applauded the ruling for upholding the democratic values 
of this country that allow the people to self-govern through acting as 
jurors.13 Proponents of damage caps, including physicians and 
insurance groups, such as the Medical Association of Georgia, report 
that one thousand physicians have moved into Georgia since Senate 
Bill 3 passed and that insurance costs are down by eighteen percent.14 
Opponents to the bill say that caps will not lower insurance 
premiums, that they fail to hold people accountable for actions, and 
that they deny proper access to courts. Opponents further contend 
that there are very few excessive jury verdicts.15 
This Note has two primary purposes. The first is to examine the 
need for tort reform legislation in the United States in order to reduce 
health care costs for patients, doctors, and insurers, and to foster 
competition and availability of health care providers in all areas of 
the country. The second purpose is to examine actions available to 
the Georgia legislature by (1) examining how noneconomic damage 
                                                                                                                 
medical malpractice field of legislation as it has generally been a question for the states). 
 12. See Palmer, supra note 4. 
 13. Palmer, supra note 4. Plaintiff’s lawyers in general have applauded rulings striking down caps 
on noneconomic damages. For example, after Illinois struck down a similar statute, the Illinois Trial 
Lawyers Associations said, “the health-care crisis can not [sic] be solved by further hurting the patients 
who are victims of medical errors.” Nathan Koppel, Illinois Supreme Court Tosses Malpractice Award 
Curbs, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2010, 7:13 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703357104575045624066646704.html. Additionally, 
opponents to caps on noneconomic damages believe the damages do not adequately deter wrongful 
conduct, that jury awards are not excessive, and that damage caps will not actually reduce medical 
malpractice insurance costs. F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” 
Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 494–95 (2006) (discussing pros and cons of caps on noneconomic 
damage). 
 14. Palmer, supra note 4 (citing to statistics provided by MAG Mutual Insurance Co. that state, 
“medical liability insurance costs are down 18 percent” since 2005 and a study performed by the Carl 
Vinson Institute of Government at the University of Georgia that states there are “about 1,000 more 
physicians in Georgia since the tort reform law passed in 2005”). 
 15. Hannah Yi Crockett et al., Note, Torts and Civil Practice, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 221, 232–33 
(2005) (citing to several senators who opposed the bill during the senate floor debate). Then Senator 
Kasim Reed of the 35th district said that tort reform fails to reduce insurance premiums, citing the 
effects of reforms in California as an example. Id. However, in California, medical malpractice liability 
insurance premiums have increased at a much lower rate than national rates. Jeffrey E. Piccola, Cap 
Noneconomic Damages, Attorneys’ Fees, PHYSICIAN’S NEWS DIG., June 2003, available at 
http://www.physiciansnews.com/commentary/603piccola.html. 
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caps have survived in other states, (2) determining whether a 
constitutional amendment is viable, and (3) offering alternative 
solutions to damage caps. 
Part I of this Note explores the current state of the law, the history 
of tort reform in the United States, and the necessity for legislation 
that protects doctors—especially obstetricians— insurers, and 
patients.16 Part II examines the Georgia Supreme Court’s ruling and 
its policy implications.17 Specifically, Part II will analyze (1) why 
these statutes are, in fact, constitutional, (2) the problematic nature of 
the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision and the ability of the 
legislature to work around its holding, and (3) other possible 
legislative solutions.18 In light of this reasoning, Part III proposes that 
the Georgia General Assembly amend the Georgia Constitution to 
specifically allow the legislature to enact laws that place limits on 
non-economic damages in medical liability cases.19 Alternatively, 
Part III proposes the General Assembly should attempt to pass into 
law limits on joint and several liability, loser pay rules, and new 
procedural rules that would make frivolous lawsuits more difficult to 
bring and decrease the possibility of a windfall recovery.20 Finally, 
Part III recommends that all states should rally for a federal tort 
reform bill.21 
I. TORT REFORM: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
A. History of Tort Reform in the United States and Georgia 
Tort reform and caps on noneconomic damages have been the 
subject of debate since the 1970s due to what was deemed a “medical 
malpractice crisis.”22 In the 1970s, legislatures began to narrow 
                                                                                                                 
 16. See discussion infra Part I. 
 17. See discussion infra Part II. 
 18. See discussion infra Parts II.B–D 
 19. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 20. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 21. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 22. Rosenblatt et al., supra note 4, at 693 (reporting that beginning in the ‘70s and ‘80s legislative 
responses included regulating the insurance and medical industries and reforming the judicial tort 
system). 
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statutes of limitation in an effort to make malpractice insurance more 
affordable by reducing the number and size of lawsuits brought 
against physicians.23 California was the first state to enact a damage 
cap provision in 1975 and has since seen success in reduction of 
medical liability premiums compared to the nation overall and to 
those states that have not enacted damage caps.24 More recently, 
states have been struggling with the constitutionality of the caps.25 
Georgia’s first attempt at capping noneconomic damages came 
with the Tort Reform Act of 2005, which also included an end to 
joint and several liability—a procedural rule that encourages 
settlement—among other procedural rules that protect medical 
malpractice defendants.26 The Georgia legislature overwhelmingly 
supported the passage of the act.27 The House of Representatives 
made several proposals to changing the bill, one of which changed 
the cap amount from $250,000 to $350,000 and attempted to allow 
greater recovery for catastrophic injury, which failed by one vote.28 
The Act has run into several constitutional challenges in the courts 
that have severely limited its power and undermined the legislature’s 
reasons for enacting the safeguards.29 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Id. at 693. All four states the researcher investigated limited the statute of limitations for 
malpractice actions in the ‘70s and ‘80s. Id. Washington limited the time period to three years for 
negligence claims, Alaska limited to two years, Montana limited to three years from injury or discovery, 
and Idaho limited to two years after injury or one year after discovery. Id. at 697. 
 24. ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9. California passed the Medical Injury Compensation Reform 
Act of 1975 (MICRA), which capped noneconomic damages at $250,000. Id. California had a 167% 
increase in medical liability premiums in the years from 1975–2003, while the rest of the nation saw a 
505% increase, and states that enacted no caps on damages, like Pennsylvania, saw a 1,400% increase in 
the same time period. Piccola, supra note 15. 
 25. DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10 (outlining the cases and outcomes that have challenged the 
constitutionality of the statutes that cap noneconomic damages). 
 26. See generally Crockett et al., supra note 15. Section 11 of the bill added the cap on noneconomic 
damages to section 13 of the Georgia Code. Id. at 228. Additionally the legislature added a section that 
penalizes the parties for “rejecting a reasonable offer of judgment by requiring them to pay the opposing 
party’s attorney’s fees.” Id. at 226. The Act also contained a provision that limited hospital liability to 
actions of their agents, and stipulated a plaintiff must prove “gross negligence” by “clear and convincing 
evidence” in emergency room settings. Id. at 230, 234. 
 27. Crockett et al., supra note 15. The Senate passed the bill in a vote of 39 to 15. Id. at 233. The 
House passed the bill in a vote of 136 to 34. Id. at 237. 
 28. Crockett et al., supra note 15, at 235. The house adopted the $350,000 cap amount without 
objection. Id. 
 29. See generally Crockett et al., supra note 15. The damage caps have been ruled unconstitutional 
due to violation of the right to trial by jury. Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 
5
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B. The Current State of Caps on Noneconomic Medical Malpractice 
Damages 
As of February 2008, thirty states have passed legislation that 
limits the amount of money receivable for noneconomic damages in 
medical malpractice cases.30 A slight majority of states have 
determined the statutes do not violate their respective constitutions.31 
In states that have ruled the statutes unconstitutional, a few 
legislatures have responded by passing new damage cap laws.32 For 
example, in 2010, Illinois struck down a statute capping 
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice, after striking down a 
cap on noneconomic damages in 1997 and a similar cap on economic 
and noneconomic damages in 1976.33 
The damage caps differ widely among the states, as the amount 
capped can range from $250,000 for noneconomic damage to $1.75 
million for caps on total damages, but Georgia’s statute is fairly 
                                                                                                                 
218 (Ga. 2010). Additionally, there have been constitutional challenges to the offer judgment provision 
of Georgia Code section 9-11-68. Merritt E. McAlister, The Swift, Silent Sword Hiding in the (Defense) 
Attorney’s Arsenal: The Inefficacy of Georgia’s New Offer of Judgment Statutes as Procedural Tort 
Reform, 40 GA. L. REV. 995, 1027 (2006). 
 30. ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9. These caps vary widely on both amount of damages 
allowed and the type of damages covered. For example, some states cap all damages while other states 
only cap noneconomic damages. See, e.g., id. The Georgia statute explicitly states it only covers 
noneconomic damages. Id.; GA. CODE ANN. § 51-13-1 (2005), declared unconstitutional by Nestlehutt, 
691 S.E.2d 218. 
 31. ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9. As of publication date of this article in 2008, seventeen of 
the thirty states upheld the damage caps. Id. However, in some of the states where the caps were 
overturned the legislatures have enacted new laws after the old caps were found unconstitutional. Id. 
Some courts have continued to overturn the new legislation. Id. For example, in February 2010, Illinois 
struck down a cap on noneconomic damages for the third time. Sack, supra note 11; see also DIV. OF 
HEALTH LAW, supra note 10 (providing an update through October 2009, showing a majority of states 
upholding the statutes). 
 32. See Sack, supra note 11. The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled damage cap statutes 
unconstitutional three times. Id. North Dakota also enacted new caps after a previous law was struck 
down. ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9 (citing Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978). In 
New Hampshire, a damage cap was struck down in 1980 and a second damage cap was overturned again 
in 1991. ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9 (citing Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H. 1991); 
Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980)). 
 33. Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 914 (Ill. 2010) (finding the caps violated the 
separation of powers clause of the Illinois constitution); Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 
(Ill. 1997); ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9 (citing Wright v. Cent. DuPage Hosp. Ass’n, 347 
N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976)). The statute overturned in 1976 was a $500,000 cap on economic and 
noneconomic damages, while the statutes overturned in 1997 and 2010 were both $500,000 caps on 
noneconomic damages. ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9. 
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similar to other states.34 Georgia Code section 51-13-1 provided that 
in medical malpractice cases the total amount of noneconomic 
damages was limited to an amount under $350,000 even in cases of 
wrongful death.35 The statute explicitly stated that the term 
“noneconomic damages” did not include items such as past and 
future medical expenses, wages, or income.36 The term 
“noneconomic damages” was defined in the statute as “physical and 
emotional pain, discomfort, anxiety, hardship . . . loss of enjoyment 
of life . . . loss of consortium . . . and all other nonpecuniary losses of 
any kind or nature.”37 
Georgia Code section 51-13-1 was an important part of the Tort 
Reform Act of 2005 that addressed what the General Assembly 
called a medical crisis.38 Despite this legislative intent, the Georgia 
Supreme Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional in Atlanta 
Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt.39 In Nestlehutt, the plaintiff 
sued a medical facility that employed the physician who performed a 
facelift that left her permanently disfigured.40 After a mistrial, the 
second jury awarded the plaintiff $1,265,000, which included 
medical expenses plus noneconomic damages of pain and suffering 
in the amount of $900,000 and $250,000 for loss of consortium.41 
Georgia Code section 51-13-1 would have reduced the award for pain 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-13-1 (2005); ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9. California’s statute, 
which was the first damage cap enacted in 1975 limited noneconomic to $250,000 while Nebraska sets a 
cap on total damages at $1.75 million. See ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9. Unlike Georgia, some 
statutes adjust for inflation and do not apply in gross malpractice claims. Id. Most states, like Georgia, 
cap noneconomic damages at $250,000 to $350,000 and have fixed caps that do not have exceptions for 
certain injuries. Id. 
 35. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-13-1 (2005), declared unconstitutional by Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Crockett et al., supra note 15, at 232. Representative Tom Rice said he based his support of the 
Tort Reform Act on “simple economics.” Id. at 235. He said the simple economics were due to “the 
increase in insurance premiums, the number of insurance companies leaving the state, and the number of 
medical specialists and facilities leaving the state.” Id. 
 39. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d at 220. 
 40. Id. The plaintiff sued the medical facility, Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery who employed Harvey 
P. Cole, M.D. the surgeon that caused Ms. Nestlhutt’s disfigurement during facelift surgery in 2006. Id. 
 41. Id. 
7
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and suffering and loss of consortium to the statutory limit of 
$350,000.42 
The trial court refused to reduce the damage amount as directed in 
the statute and denied the defendant’s request for new trial. 
Subsequently, the defendant appealed the ruling.43 The Georgia 
Supreme Court ultimately found the statute violated the right to a 
jury trial found in the Georgia Constitution and declined to consider 
the alternative arguments of whether it violated the separation of 
powers or the equal protection clause of its constitution.44 
Georgia is far from the only state that has wrestled with this issue, 
as thus far twenty-nine states have faced constitutional challenges to 
caps on noneconomic damages.45 The reasoning articulated by courts 
that have ruled statutes unconstitutional varies widely, giving the 
Georgia Supreme Court many lines of reasoning to strike down any 
new cap statutes that may come its way.46 For example, the Illinois 
Supreme Court ruled such statutes unconstitutional on three separate 
occasions for two reasons: in 1997, the court found the statute 
violated the prohibition against special legislation, and in 2010 
determined the newest cap violated the separation of powers doctrine 
in the state’s constitution.47 New Hampshire also struck down 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Id. The court was to reduce the jury’s damages by $800,000 to $350,000 according to the statute. 
See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-13-1 (2005). 
 43. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d at 220. The plaintiffs moved to have Georgia Code section 51-13-1 
declared unconstitutional, which the trial court granted and allowed the full measure of damages to be 
awarded. Id. at 220. The trial court found not only that the statute violated the right to trial by jury but 
also violated the doctrines of separation of powers and equal protection. Id. The defendants then 
appealed their denied motion for a new trial, which ultimately reached the Georgia Supreme Court. Id. 
The appellants asked the Georgia Supreme Court to determine whether the statute violated the right to 
jury trial and whether the statute applies retroactively. Id. at 220–26. The Court responded affirmatively 
to both questions. Id. 
 44. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d at 224. The alternative arguments are found in the Georgia constitution. 
The first is the separation of powers doctrine under article I, section II, paragraph III, and the second is 
the equal protection clause found in article I, section I, paragraph II. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 2; GA. 
CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 3. 
 45. See, e.g., DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10. The American Medical Association has listed the 
states through October 2009 that have faced constitutional challenges to the non-economic damage 
statutes. Id. The chart lists whether the caps were upheld or struck down, the case that brought the 
question to the court, and a short description of the court’s rationale for upholding or striking down the 
statute. Id. 
 46. See, e.g., DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10 (outlining the rationales courts use for striking 
down damage cap statutes). 
 47. Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 914 (Ill. 2010) (holding that a limit on 
8
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damage cap statutes on separate occasions, finding in both 1980 and 
1991 that the caps violated the state’s equal protection doctrine.48 
South Dakota and Texas found the statutes violated the open courts 
doctrine by creating unreasonable and arbitrary limits in litigation.49 
However, a more recent Texas decision upheld a new damage cap 
statute, stating it did not violate the open courts doctrine.50 In light of 
the many lines of reasoning the Georgia Supreme Court can use in 
the future to find caps unconstitutional, passing a constitutional 
damage cap may be difficult.51 Thus, other reform measures should 
be considered.52 
C. The Importance of Limiting Damages in Medical Malpractice 
Cases 
Tort reform is an important topic in light of the large costs of 
medical malpractice liability in the U.S., which Harvard University 
recently determined to be $55.6 billion annually.53 The American 
                                                                                                                 
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice lawsuits violate the separation of powers clause in the 
Illinois constitution); Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1081 (Ill. 1997) (finding the cap 
violated the prohibition against special legislation and separation of powers clause). 
 48. DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10 (citing Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H. 1991); 
Carson v. Maurer, 425 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980)). In Brannigan, the court reasoned the caps violated due 
process because the purpose of the legislation, to bring down health care costs, did not outweigh 
individual rights. Id. 
 49. DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10 (citing Knowles ex rel. Knowles v. United States, 544 
N.W.2d 687 (S.D. 1996); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988)). In Knowles, the court 
found the statute violated the open courts doctrine (that prohibits legislation that hinders access to 
courts) because it limited a provider’s liability arbitrarily. Id. In Lucas the court found the limits were 
unreasonable and arbitrary. Id. 
 50. DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10 (citing Rose v. Doctor’s Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 
1990)); Mary Alice Robbins, State Cap on Non-Economic Damages a No-Go in Eastern District of 
Texas Case, LAW.COM (Sept. 17, 2010), 
http://texaslawyer.typepad.com/texas_lawyer_blog/2010/09/challenge-to-hb-4s-cap-on-non-economic-
damages-a-no-go-in-eastern-district-of-texas-case.html. A magistrate judge for the Eastern District of 
Texas found that the Tort Reform Act of 2003, which places a cap on non-economic damages, did not 
violate the open courts doctrine because it did not hinder access to the courts. Robbins, supra (citing 
Watson v. Hortman, No. 2:08-CV-81-TJW-CE, slip op. at 5 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2010)). 
 51. Andy Peters, Legislators Are Left with Few Options, FULTON CNTY. DAILY REP., Mar. 23, 2010. 
At this point, the legislature’s only option is to amend the constitution to reverse the court. Id. An 
amendment requires approval of two-thirds of the House and Senate. Id. However, in March 2010, the 
chair of the Senate Health and Human Services Committee said they could not get the votes. Id. 
 52. Peters, supra note 51 (explaining that the Medical Association of Georgia said it would look into 
alternative legislative options). 
 53. Bruce Japsen, Malpractice Costs Top $55 Billion a Year in U.S., CHI. TRIB. 
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Medical Association has called for states to pass various tort reform 
packages to stem the rise of liability premiums that may cause 
doctors to leave certain practice areas.54 The Western Journal of 
Medicine found that issues related to medical malpractice, such as 
malpractice insurance, are “the most powerful factors” when 
physicians consider whether to provide obstetric services.55 For 
example, many general and family physicians no longer provide 
obstetric care because of the high price and frequency of malpractice 
lawsuits in the area.56 However, according to the American Medical 
Association, “non-economic caps and direct tort reforms more 
generally have a positive effect on the number of physicians per 
capita in a state.”57 
II. LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS FOR REDUCING THE PRICE OF MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 
A. How Georgia Courts Got it Wrong 
Georgia is in the minority of states that have found caps on 
noneconomic damages unconstitutional, and five of the eleven states 
that have struck down noneconomic caps have enacted new caps that 
still stand.58 Only four states besides Georgia have found that 
                                                                                                                 
(Sept. 8, 2010, 7:09 PM), http://chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-0909-notebook-health-
20100908,0,4495498.story (stating that Harvard University found “the annual overall cost of medical 
liability to be $55.6 billion.”). The analysis included payments of damages, attorney’s fees and lost work 
time for doctors. Id. 
 54. CAROL K. KANE & DAVID W. EMMONS, AM. MED. ASS’N, THE IMPACT OF CAPS ON DAMAGES. 
HOW ARE MARKETS FOR MEDICAL LIABILITY INSURANCE AND MEDICAL SERVICES AFFECTED? (2005), 
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/363/prp200502caps.pdf. 
 55. Rosenblatt et al., supra note 4, at 693–98 (“During the 1980’s, thousands of providers stopped 
practicing obstetrics or severely limited the scope of their practices, most frequently citing their 
concerns about medical malpractice as the reason for these changes in their obstetric practices.”). 
 56. Id. at 698. 
 57. KANE & EMMONS, supra note 54, at 2. According to the association’s research, states 
experienced lower growth of medical liability insurance rates when tort reform legislation was passed. 
Id. Studies using the American Medical Association’s demographic information on physicians show that 
states with direct tort reforms increased physician supply relative to non-reform states, especially in 
high-risk specialties. Id. at 5. 
 58. DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10. As of publication, eleven out of twenty-nine states with 
damage caps ruled that noneconomic damage caps were unconstitutional. Id. In 1978, North Dakota 
struck down a damage cap for violating the right to trial by jury but enacted a new statute in 1995. Id. 
(citing Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 134–37 (N.D. 1978)). Ohio struck down a damage cap for 
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noneconomic caps violated the right to trial by jury, one of which has 
since enacted a new cap.59 The Georgia Supreme Court in Nestlehutt 
stated in a footnote the contradictory authority was weak because the 
states had “less comprehensive” jury trial provisions or employed 
“unpersuasive reasoning.”60 However, the reasoning of the courts 
with “less comprehensive” jury trial provisions is very similar to the 
courts with an equally comprehensive jury trial provision as 
Georgia.61 Utah’s constitution states the right to trial by jury is 
inviolate only in capital cases.62 However, the Utah Supreme Court 
still found the jury decides the facts and the court can apply law by 
reducing damages.63 This is the same reasoning the Ohio court used, 
a state which has a strong constitutional provision for the right to trial 
by jury just like Georgia.64 
Courts have reasoned caps do not impinge on the right to a jury 
trial because they do not remove determination of the facts from the 
jury.65 Generally, courts have determined that after a jury has reached 
its verdict, the trial court may properly enter judgment consistent 
with the law.66 Moreover, courts have pointed out that legislatures 
                                                                                                                 
violating the due process clause in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 
1062 (1999), but enacted a new law in 2002. Oklahoma struck down its damage cap in 2008 and enacted 
a new law in 2009. Id. (citing Woods v. Unity Health Ctr., Inc., 196 P.3d 529, 531 (2008)). Texas struck 
down a damage cap as applied to medical malpractice caps in 1988, but enacted new legislation in 2003. 
Id. (citing Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988)). Wisconsin’s damage cap was struck 
down in 2005 and new legislation was enacted a year later in 2006. Id. (citing Ferdon v. Wis. Patient 
Comp. Fund, 284 Wis. 2d 573 (2005)). Thus, only six states that have struck down their damage caps 
remain without damage caps today. 
 59. DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10. Only four other states, Alabama, North Dakota, Oregon, 
and Washington found the damage cap statutes were an unconstitutional infringement of the right to trial 
by jury. Id. In 1978, a North Dakota court found a damage cap statute that included a limit on damages 
to $300,000 violated the right to trial by jury. Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 134–37. The court said that the 
right to trial by jury was a basic right in the state and the statute was an unconstitutional deprivation of 
that right. Id. at 137. In 1995, North Dakota enacted a $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages in 
medical malpractice actions. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-42-02 (1995). The new cap has not yet been 
constitutionally challenged. See DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10. 
 60. Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 224 n.8 (Ga. 2010). 
 61. See, e.g., Arbino v. Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420, 430–33 (Ohio 2007); Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 
135, 144–46 (Utah 2004). 
 62. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 63. Judd, 103 P.3d at 145. 
 64. Arbino, 880 N.E.2d at 430–33. 
 65. Arbino, 880 N.E.2d at 431; Judd, 103 P.3d at 146. 
 66. See, e.g., Arbino, 880 N.E.2d at 432; Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1120 
(Idaho 2000) (“The legal consequences and effect of a jury’s verdict are a matter for the legislature (by 
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have set limits in other ways, such as through statutes of limitation, 
so it logically follows that the legislature can also limit remedies.67 
Courts have argued that remedies are a matter of law, not fact, and 
because limits are assigned after a jury completes its fact-finding 
function, remedies do not apply to a jury’s role.68 Further, the right to 
a jury trial guarantees only rights that existed at common law and 
some courts have pointed out there is no common law right to a full 
recovery in tort cases.69 This logical rationale used by other courts 
warrants at least more than a dismissive sentence in a footnote. 
In Nestlehutt, the Georgia Supreme Court did not address the 
separation of powers or equal protection arguments made by the trial 
court because it already held the statute unconstitutional for violating 
the right to trial by jury.70 However, it is important to realize these 
constitutional provisions do not bar caps on damages in the majority 
of states.71 The courts that have found a violation of the separation of 
powers doctrine say the legislature encroaches on the judiciary’s 
power of review by enacting caps.72 For example, in Kirkland v. 
Blaine County Medical Center73 the plaintiff argued that the cap 
infringes on “the inherent right of the courts to reduce jury verdicts in 
those instances where the evidence demonstrates the jury’s verdict is 
                                                                                                                 
passing laws) and the courts (by applying those laws to the facts as found by the jury).”). 
 67. Phillips v. MIRAC, Inc., 651 N.W.2d 437, 442 (Mich. 2002). The court mentioned the 
legislature’s limitations in rules such as governmental immunity from tort liability, workers’ 
compensation being the exclusive remedy against employers, or certain tort cases where the plaintiff is 
at fault for her own injuries. Id. 
 68. E.g., Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 117–18 (Md. 1992) (finding that the statute does not 
apply until the jury’s fact-finding function is completed and noting that a majority of the states that have 
considered this question have found caps do not violate the right to jury trial); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. 
Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525, 529 (Va. 1989) (holding there is no violation of the right to trial by jury when 
the jury resolved the facts and assessed damages before the court applied the law to the facts). 
 69. See, e.g., Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 529 (Va. 1989). “[T]he jury resolved the disputed facts and 
assessed the damages.” Id. Once this task is completed, the trial court is free to apply the law and reduce 
the verdict. Id. 
 70. Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 224 (Ga. 2010). The trial court 
found the statute unconstitutional for violating the right to trial by jury, separation of powers, and the 
right to equal protection. Id. at 220. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the ruling after finding the 
statute violates the right to trial by jury. Id. 
 71. ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9. 
 72. Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 908 (Ill. 2010) (stating the relevant question is 
whether “the statute unduly encroach[es] on the judiciary’s ‘sphere of authority’”). 
 73. Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1115 (Idaho 2000). 
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excessive as a matter of law.”74 However, in Kirkland, the court 
reasoned that “because it is properly within the power of the 
legislature to establish statutes of limitations . . . create new causes of 
action, and otherwise modify common law without violating 
separation of powers,” the power to limit damages does not violate 
the separation of powers.75 Another court took the analysis one step 
further saying, “[W]ere a court to ignore the legislatively-determined 
remedy . . . the court would invade the province of the legislature.”76 
Plaintiffs have argued that caps violate equal protection because 
caps do not allow similarly situated persons to be treated alike—
some plaintiffs can recover fully, while those who have noneconomic 
damages totaling more than the statute cannot recover their full 
amount of damages.77 Some courts have used the “rational basis” test 
to determine whether there is a violation of equal protection and most 
courts considering the question have found equal protection is not 
violated.78 However, other courts like New Hampshire have found 
damage caps unconstitutional because the purpose of the legislation 
does not outweigh the rights of individuals.79 
Other states have found varying reasons for striking down damage 
caps that the Georgia Supreme Court did not consider.80 These 
reasons include violation of a state’s prohibition against special 
legislation, violation of the Due Process Clause, and violation of the 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Id. at 1121–22. 
 75. Id. at 1222. The court said the legislature made a valid change in the common law of personal 
injury and thus did not violate the separation of powers clause. Id. 
 76. Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525, 532 (Va. 1989). The court said the General 
Assembly had the power to provide and modify common law remedies, and “clearly” a modification of 
common law is a proper exercise of legislative power. Id. 
 77. See Phillips v. MIRAC, Inc., 651 N.W.2d 437, 443–44 (Mich. 2002). Only two states have 
actually used this as a reason for finding caps unconstitutional, and of the two, one of the states has 
enacted a new damage cap statute. DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10 (citing Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli 
v. Wis. Patient Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 2005); Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H. 
1991); Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp., 623 N.W.2d 776 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000)). 
 78. See DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10; see e.g. Phillips, 651 N.W.2d at 444–45 (stating the 
plaintiff here must show legislation is “arbitrary and wholly unrelated in a rational way to the objective 
of the statute”). “[T]he statute is presumed constitutional, and the party challenging it bears a heavy 
burden of rebutting that presumption.” Id. at 445. 
 79. DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10 (citing Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H. 1991)). 
 80. See generally DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10. 
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“open courts” doctrine.81 The prohibition on special legislation is a 
constitutional provision that prohibits the legislature from passing 
local or special laws in certain cases, such as releasing liability of a 
party. Only one state has used this rationale.82 The Due Process 
Clause provides no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law,” and follows virtually the same 
test to determine constitutionality as Equal Protection Clauses.83 An 
example of a state constitution with an open courts provision 
provides, “All courts shall be open, and every person . . . shall have a 
remedy . . . .”84 An Ohio court determined damage caps do not 
violate the right to open courts because they do not block a person’s 
ability to pursue a claim.85 
B. Amending the Georgia Constitution 
A second option for the Georgia General Assembly is to amend the 
state constitution. According to some Georgia lawmakers, this may 
be the only option based on the court’s strong language in 
Nestlehutt.86 The constitutional amendment would specifically allow 
the legislature to place limits on noneconomic damages in medical 
liability cases. Texas passed such an amendment to its constitution 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Woods v. Unity Health Ctr., Inc., 196 P.3d 529, 531 (2008) (finding damage cap unconstitutional 
special legislation). See generally Knowles ex rel. Knowles v. United States, 544 N.W.2d 183, 187 (S.D. 
1996) (finding total damage caps violate right to due process and open courts doctrine); DIV. OF HEALTH 
LAW, supra note 10. 
 82. Woods, 196 P.3d at 531. However, Oklahoma has since enacted a new damage cap statute. DIV. 
OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10. 
 83. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 17; Phillips, 651 N.W.2d at 444–45 (determining the damage cap does not 
violate due process under the same rationale with which they determined the statute does not violate 
equal protection). 
 84. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16. 
 85. Arbino v. Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420, 432–33 (Ohio 2007). The court found that the open courts 
doctrine applies where an individual is “wholly foreclosed from damages after a verdict is rendered in 
his or her favor,” like when collateral source benefits reduce an entire award. Id. at 433. In cases where 
the plaintiff can recover some noneconomic damages, it does not violate the right to remedy or the right 
to an open court. Id. 
 86. Peters, supra note 51. According to “three Republican state senators and two legislators in 
private practice,” the best option for the General Assembly is to amend the constitution because the 
court voiced strong dislike for damage caps. Id. In Nestlehutt the court said, “The very existence of the 
caps, in any amount, is violative of the right to trial by jury.” Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. 
Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 223 (Ga. 2010). Also, the fact that this was a unanimous ruling does not 
bode well for any different result in the future. Peters, supra note 51. 
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that was approved by voters in 2003.87 Texas’ amendment has 
allowed the legislature to cap noneconomic damages at $250,000 and 
pass a law that requires plaintiffs to provide expert support for a 
claim within four months of filing the suit.88 
According to the Texas Solicitor General, James Ho, the 
amendment makes challenges such as the Nestlehutt case 
impossible.89 Instead, claimants are only able to file claims in federal 
court.90 Recently in Texas, plaintiffs brought a case into federal court 
challenging the caps’ constitutionality and the U.S. magistrate judge 
for the Eastern District of Texas upheld the caps.91 According to the 
lead attorney for the defendant in the case, damage caps have always 
been a state issue and “no final ruling of any federal court has found 
a cap on non-economic damages unconstitutional.”92 
C. Other Legislative Solutions 
1. Current Legislative Solutions 
The General Assembly has already taken other measures that will 
aid in the reduction of damage awards and frivolous lawsuits. For 
example, Georgia Code section 51-12-31 and 51-12-33 effectively 
end joint and several liability, thus making it more difficult for 
plaintiffs “to recover disproportionately from ‘deep pockets.’”93 
                                                                                                                 
 87. TEX CONST. art. III, § 66; ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9. Proposition 12, an amendment to 
the Texas Constitution that allows the legislature to place limits on noneconomic damages, was passed 
by voters in 2003. Id. The amendment came after a Texas court found caps unconstitutional for violating 
the open courts doctrine in 1988. DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10. 
 88. Perry, supra note 4. 
 89. Robbins, supra note 50. The Solicitor General represented the defendants in a Texas case that 
challenged the constitutionality of Texas’ damage cap provision in federal court. Id. 
 90. Id. The plaintiffs in Watson v. Hortman were forced to file their case in the Eastern District of 
Texas alleging damage caps are unconstitutional for violating the right of access to the courts, the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Petition Clause of the First 
Amendment. Id. On September 13, 2010, the U.S. magistrate judge in the Eastern District of Texas 
recommended the defendants were entitled to summary judgment because the cap is not 
unconstitutional. Id. 
 91. Robbins, supra note 50. In the Watson case, the U.S. magistrate judge handed down the 
recommendation to the U.S. district judge presiding over the case to make a final judgment. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-12-31, -33 (2005). The statutes provide that defendants are only 
responsible for their portion of plaintiff’s injury and stipulates a jury must apportion fault between all 
15
Nutt: Where Do We Go from Here? The Future of Caps on Noneconomic Medic
Published by Reading Room, 2012
1354 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:4 
Also, Georgia Code section 9-11-68 penalizes a party who refuses a 
reasonable offer of judgment.94 Proponents of section 9-11-68 argue 
it encourages parties to settle out of court.95 Finally, Georgia Code 
section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert provide an affidavit when the 
complaint is filed in malpractice cases.96 The expert requirement 
ensures frivolous lawsuits will not “drag on indefinitely.”97 However, 
more can be done by the legislature. 
2. Possible Solutions to Consider 
a. Attorney Fee Controls 
First, attorney fee controls may be a viable option for the General 
Assembly.98 Currently, there is no limitation on the amount of 
attorney fees available in medical malpractice cases.99 Some states 
limit the percentage of damage awards lawyers can receive in civil 
cases.100 Alaska sets its limits through a sliding scale approach, 
differentiating in the percentage of fees an attorney may collect based 
on whether the damage award was non-contested, contested without a 
                                                                                                                 
defendants involved in the injury. Id. Rosenblatt et al., supra note 4, at 693, 695 (stating these measures 
were taken by the states that have seen positive results from its tort reform legislation including 
Washington, Alaska, Montana, and Idaho). 
 94. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-68(b) (2005). A defendant is entitled to attorney’s fees if the judgment 
amount is less than 75% of its offer and plaintiff is entitled to fees if the judgment award is greater than 
125% of its offer. Id. The Georgia Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of this statute. Smith 
v. Baptiste, 694 S.E.2d 83, 84 (Ga. 2010) (finding the statute is not an impermissible special law, does 
not violate the uniformity clause of the Georgia Constitution, and does not violate the right to the 
courts). 
 95. Crockett et al., supra note 15, at 245. However, opponents say this measure is unnecessary since 
the vast majority of lawsuits are settled outside of court anyway, and they fear this could cause “wealthy 
defendants [to] bully private citizen plaintiffs into accepting ‘low ball’ offers.” Id. (citing Matthew C. 
Flournoy, Georgia’s Newly Enacted 2005 Law on Offer of Judgment or Settlement (OJS) O.C.G.A. 9-
11-68(a) to (d) (Section 5 of S.B.3), in INST. OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. IN GA., GEORGIA’S NEWLY 
ENACTED 2005 TORT REFORM, SENATE BILL 3, ANALYSIS AND PRACTICAL TIPS 6–7 (2005)). 
 96. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (2005). 
 97. Perry, supra note 4 (stating changes like this legislation have protected both patients and doctors 
from clogging up the system with baseless lawsuits). 
 98. Rosenblatt et al., supra note 4, at 693, 696 (finding three of the researched states have enacted 
some form of attorney’s fee controls). 
 99. Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Georgia, MCCULLOUGH, CAMPBELL & LANE LLP (Apr. 
2, 2010), http://www.mcandl.com/georgia.html. 
 100. See, e.g., ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82; N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474-a (McKinney 1986). 
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trial, or contested at trial.101 Reformers believe controlling fees deters 
attorneys from filing frivolous lawsuits and enables the plaintiff to 
keep more of the award.102  
b. Allowing Evidence of Collateral Sources 
The ability to reveal a plaintiff’s collateral source of compensation 
would also help guard against frivolous and windfall lawsuits.103 At 
common law in most states, including Georgia, the collateral source 
rule hides from the jury any other benefit, such as insurance 
payments, that the plaintiff has received.104 Proponents of the rule say 
it is unfair to the plaintiff to reduce damages because of their 
insurance benefits and that it fails to properly deter the defendant.105 
Opponents of the rule suggest that it is inherently unfair that a 
plaintiff recovers twice for the same injury, resulting in windfall 
profits.106 Some states recognize that windfall profits for plaintiffs 
mean increased medical malpractice insurance costs for physicians, 
resulting in decreased access to health care for the citizens of the 
state. In response, these states have enacted legislation to curb this 
common law practice, such as statutes allowing evidence of a 
collateral source to be brought in after the fact finder has already 
                                                                                                                 
 101. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82. The rule sets fees based on a sliding scale whereby it assigns a percentage 
of attorney’s fees based on the amount of the award and how it was achieved. Id. For example, if a 
judgment is below $25,000 and awarded at trial, an attorney receives 20% of the award, but if non-
contested, an attorney receives 10% of the award. Id. Likewise, if the judgment is for over $500,000, an 
attorney receives 10% of the award if litigated, but only 1% if non-contested. Id. The rule also gives 
room for judicial discretion based on a number of factors including bad faith, the amount of work 
performed, and the reasonableness of the claim. Id. 
 102. Lee Harris & Jennifer Longo, Flexible Tort Reform, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 61, 80–81 
(2007). Opponents argue that attorneys already have an incentive not to take frivolous lawsuits through 
the existence of contingency fees themselves. Id. 
 103. Rosenblatt et al., supra note 4, at 693, 697 (asserting three of the four states in the study enacted 
collateral source rules). 
 104. F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 437, 485 (2006). Therefore, the court cannot reduce a damage award by the amount paid by an 
outside source. Id. Georgia’s collateral source rule currently bars defendants from presenting any 
evidence of third party payments in tort cases and common law has held there are no exceptions to this 
rule. Olariu v. Marrero, 549 S.E.2d 121, 123 (2001) (stating, “The common law rule made no exceptions 
for the introduction of evidence as to a collateral source, which rule remains applicable today.”). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.; Harris & Longo, supra note 102, at 76–77. 
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awarded damages.107 However, statutes that abrogate or abolish the 
collateral source rule have often been challenged on the same or 
similar grounds as damage cap statutes.108 These challenges will be 
yet another hurdle for legislators to overcome. 
c. Procedural Rules 
Some courts have enacted screening panels such as mandatory 
mediation or arbitration.109 For example, in Florida, parties are 
required to participate in mediation prior to a lawsuit.110 Proponents 
of reform have even suggested a specific court for medical 
malpractice suits with specially trained judges.111 Thus far, 
“seventeen states require, or encourage” plaintiffs to go through a 
screening panel prior to litigation.112 
III. WHY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD FIGHT FOR REFORM AND 
HOW TO PROCEED 
A. The Importance of Tort Reform 
The Georgia General Assembly should not give up on tort reform 
through procedural reforms because it is an important step in 
avoiding a health care crisis that has the potential of leaving some 
Georgians, especially those in rural areas, without access to 
                                                                                                                 
 107. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548 (2010); Rosenblatt et al., supra note 4, at 693, 697. Alaska’s statute 
reduces a plaintiff’s award by the amount that has already been compensated. ALASKA STAT. § 
09.55.548 (2010). At least sixteen state legislatures have attempted to abolish or modify the collateral 
source rule. 3 JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE § 19.36 (3d ed. 2011). 
 108. See Stein, supra note 107. For example, an Alabama statute that allows for the admissibility of 
evidence of a collateral source in all actions where medical damages are claimed was challenged on 
equal protection and due process grounds. Id. (citing Marsh v. Green, 782 So. 2d 223 (Ala. 2000)). The 
Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the statute was valid because it did not violate the right to trial by 
jury or other constitutional rights. Id. 
 109. Harris & Longo, supra note 102, at 72–74. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Sen. Connie Williams, Caps for Medical Malpractice Only, PHYSICIAN’S NEWS DIG., June 2003, 
available at http://www.physiciansnews.com/commentary/603williams.html (describing a bill she 
proposed in Pennsylvania). 
 112. Hubbard, supra note 104, at 521–22. Although many states had prescreening panels in the past, 
the number has been reduced due to statutes being unconstitutional. Id. at 521. 
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physicians.113 Proponents of reform like the Governor of Texas, Rick 
Perry, have said tort reform measures like caps on damages and 
various procedural measures have healed states facing a health care 
crisis.114 In 2003, two-thirds of the counties in Texas had no 
practicing obstetricians, 60% had no pediatricians, and twenty-four 
counties had no primary care doctors.115 This shortage of medical 
professionals meant long lines in doctors’ offices, causing patients to 
postpone medical care and allowing minor health issues to grow into 
more serious conditions.116 According to the Governor, tort reform 
has turned these statistics around by reducing insurance rates by an 
average of 27% and thus the number of doctors applying to practice 
in the state has “skyrocketed.”117 In Texas, the number of 
obstetricians in rural areas is up by 27%, and the number of 
pediatricians has grown as well.118 
Some have argued that even if tort reform measures are passed, 
insurance companies will not necessarily reduce or maintain current 
rates as a result.119 However, in Georgia, “Mag Mutual, Georgia’s 
largest medical malpractice insurance provider, indicated it would . . . 
honor the 10% rollback of insurance premiums upon the adoption of 
the House version of SB3.”120 The quote indicates a willingness of 
insurers in the state to work with physicians to make sure both parties 
benefit from a reduction in medical tort damage awards. 
Georgia may also lose health care providers simply because 
doctors tend to migrate to states like Texas that have strong tort 
reform measures and avoid states like Georgia that fail to enact 
                                                                                                                 
 113. See generally Rosenblatt et al., supra note 4 (stating that the article’s research findings are 
compatible with concluding that tort reform has decreased the rate at which physicians give up 
practicing obstetrics). 
 114. Perry, supra note 4 (“All major liability insurers cut their rates upon passage of our reforms, with 
most of those cuts ranging in the double-digits.”). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Crockett et al., supra note 15, at 232; Harris & Longo, supra note 102, at 63. For example, 
Senator Steve Thompson opposed Georgia’s damage cap provision because “he did not believe . . . a cap 
would lower insurance premiums.” Crockett et al., supra note 15, at 232. 
 120. Crockett et al., supra note 15, at 237 (quoting Senator Preston Smith during the Senate 
reconsideration of the Tort Reform Act after the House made changes). 
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damage caps. A 2005 study that examined physician supply from 
1985 to 2001 found an increased physician supply of 2.4% in reform 
states compared to non-reform states, and in “high-risk” specialties 
the increase was 11.5%.121 In order to keep current physicians in the 
state and to encourage new physicians to enter the state, Georgia 
should be proactive on this issue by passing procedural reforms now 
and attempting to amend the constitution in the future. 
B. The Inefficacy of Enacting a New Cap on Noneconomic Damages  
Some states have found success in enacting new caps on damages 
after their courts have found a statute unconstitutional.122 In those 
states, caps have effectively controlled medical malpractice insurance 
rates.123 States with caps have lower medical malpractice liability 
insurance rates and have more doctors and thus better access to 
physicians in rural areas and better health care overall.124 Proponents 
of caps argue that damage awards are erratic and unpredictable.125 
Caps not only increase predictability of awards, but also keep 
damage awards at lower, more manageable levels, which will in turn 
allow insurers to reduce the cost of coverage.126 In states like Texas 
and California, caps have been key in bringing down the cost of 
medical malpractice liability insurance.127 
In light of the Georgia Supreme Court’s strong and unanimous 
decision to block damage caps, the Georgia General Assembly 
should not pass a new damage cap provision, even though caps have 
                                                                                                                 
 121. KANE & EMMONS, supra note 54 (citing a Kessler, Sage, and Becker study that used the 
American Medical Association’s Physician Masterfile to examine the impacts of tort reform on 
physician supply). 
 122. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 123. Piccola, supra note 15 (stating California has only seen a 167% increase in medical liability rates 
while Pennsylvania, which has no such cap on noneconomic damages, has seen a rate increase of 
1,400%and the national increase was 505%). 
 124. KANE & EMMONS, supra note 54. From 1985 to 2000, states with noneconomic damage caps had 
a 2.2% increase in supply of physicians per capita compared to states without caps. Id. (citing Encinosa 
and Hellinger’s 2005 paper). See also discussion supra Part III.A. 
 125. Richard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incomensurable, and 
Inegalitarian (But Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 291(2006). 
 126. See generally id. 
 127. See Perry, supra note 4 (stating doctor’s insurance rates have dropped on average 27%); Piccola, 
supra note 15. 
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been successful in other states.128 Justice Hunstein, writing for the 
court, stated in no uncertain terms, “The very existence of the caps, 
in any amount, is violative of the right to trial by jury.”129 Michael 
Terry, an attorney for Nestlehutt, said the ruling puts the General 
Assembly on notice that any new damage cap legislation will be 
futile, adding, “The court was very clear saying, ‘You can’t do 
this.’”130 Also, there are many rationales the court has at its disposal 
to find that caps are unconstitutional even if the court later finds the 
caps do not violate the right to trial by jury, making it very unlikely 
the court will ever uphold such legislation.131 
C. The Difficulty of Amending the Constitution 
Some states have successfully amended their constitutions to 
specifically allow for caps on noneconomic damages.132 However, 
the likelihood of an amendment is currently slim.133 Georgia’s 
constitution requires approval by two-thirds of the members of both 
the House and the Senate and ratification by a majority of the voters 
in the state.134 Even though the Tort Reform Act was favorably 
passed in the House and the Senate, Senator Don Thomas predicted 
that the GOP would not be able to obtain the two-thirds votes 
necessary to approve an amendment.135 However, if the GOP can get 
the votes in the future, an amendment is probably the best possible 
                                                                                                                 
 128. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 129. Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 223 (Ga. 2010) (stating that the 
fact that plaintiffs can recover fully up to the $350,000 mark does not help the statute’s constitutionality 
because if the court finds the legislature can cap at that amount, the legislature will be able to cap any 
amount). 
 130. Rankin, supra note 1. 
 131. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 132. See discussion supra part II.B. 
 133. Peters, supra note 51. Senator Don Thomas, chair of the Senate Health and Human Services 
Committee, said that the amendment would not receive a two-thirds vote. Id. 
 134. GA. CONST. art. X, § 1, para. II. Passing an amendment is much more strenuous than passing the 
original Tort Reform Act which only required a majority vote in each house. Peters, supra note 51. 
 135. Peters, supra note 51 (stating the House may be harder to convince because of an attempted 
House Tort Reform Act to raise the cap to $750,000, which did not pass and may cause some dissent 
among even among Republicans who would traditionally favor this type of legislation). 
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solution to enacting caps on damages that withstand constitutional 
challenges.136 
D. The Effectiveness and Hurdles of New Procedural Rules 
Because the Georgia Supreme Court will most likely strike down a 
new damage cap provision and a constitutional amendment is 
probably not currently possible, the General Assembly should 
consider other legislative solutions.137 The first type of reform to 
consider is controlling attorney’s fees. Most countries use a “loser 
pay” system where the winner is entitled to reimbursement from the 
losing party.138 However, such a strict system of fee shifting may 
have a “chilling effect” on plaintiffs.139 Therefore, a better solution is 
limiting contingency fees to “weed out non-meritorious claims” 
because lawyers will have less incentive to take frivolous cases.140 
A great example of curbing attorney’s fees is New York’s sliding 
scale approach to contingency fees that replaced a one-third across-
the-board fee limit. The new approach permits an attorney to recover 
30% of the first $250,000 of an award, 25% of the next $250,000, 
20% of the next $500,000, 15% of the next $125,000, and only 10% 
of recoveries over $1,250,000.141 The New York statute allows an 
attorney to appeal for a higher percentage if compensation is 
inadequate.142 Actuaries suggest that “[e]liminating the sliding fee 
schedule entirely and returning to a one-third across-the-board cap 
                                                                                                                 
 136. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 137. See discussion supra Part III.B–C. 
 138.  Marie Gryphon, Assessing the Effects of a “Loser Pays” Rule on the American Legal System: 
An Economic Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 567, 567–68 (2011) 
(citing W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why is the United States 
the “Odd Man Out” in How It Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 361 (1999)) (noting 
many commentators agree such a system would result in a reduction in nuisance suits). 
 139. McAlister, supra note 29, at 1034. 
 140. Medical Malpractice Reform: Limiting Contingent Fees, HEALTH CARE NEWS IN DEPTH, Apr. 5, 
2010, available at www.gnyha.org/9583/File.aspx (citing ERIC NORDMAN, DAVIN CERMAK, & 
KENNETH MCDANIEL, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE REPORT: A 
STUDY OF MARKET CONDITIONS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE RECENT CRISIS (2004), available 
at http://www.naic.org/documents/topics_Med_Mal_Rpt_Final.pdf). 
 141. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474-a (McKinney 1986). 
 142. Medical Malpractice Reform: Limiting Contingent Fees, supra note 140. 
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would increase hospital costs by 25%—40% . . . .”143 Limitations like 
New York’s statute decrease the number of claims and increase the 
rate of settlement because attorneys and clients will have less 
incentive to risk going to trial to obtain a large jury award.144 A 
statute capping the amount of fees given to an attorney is likely far 
less divisive than capping the amount of damages available to a 
victim, making it an option the General Assembly is more likely to 
agree upon in today’s political climate. 
Another possible procedural rule states have used is allowing for 
the admissibility of collateral source evidence after a fact finder has 
rendered an award and where the court reduces the damage amount 
by the amount already received.145 Many states use this approach as a 
good measure to curb larger than necessary damage recoveries.146 
However, it is very likely that a statute that abrogates the collateral 
source rule would face many of the same challenges as damage 
caps.147 
A better solution is improving the dispute resolution system with 
procedural reforms, because the current process is long, expensive, 
and unpredictable.148 A study found plaintiffs recover, on average, 
five years after the time of injury.149 Malpractice system experts 
recommend creating courts dedicated specifically to evaluating 
malpractice claims.150 Special courts could “meet injured patients’ 
needs and rights by increasing access, improving consistency in 
decision-making, and enhancing equity in payments.”151 Georgia has 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. (citing Casey L. Dwyer, An Empirical Examination of the Equal Protection Challenge to 
Contingency Fee Restrictions in Medical Malpractice Reform Statutes, 56 DUKE L.J. 611 (2006)). 
 145. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548 (2010); Rosenblatt et al., supra note 4, at 697. Alaska’s statute 
reduces plaintiff’s award by the amount that has already been compensated. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548 
(2010). 
 146. See discussion supra Part II.C(2)(b). 
 147. See Stein, supra note 107. 
 148. Medical Malpractice Reform: Improving the Dispute Resolution System, HEALTH CARE NEWS IN 
DEPTH, Feb. 8, 2010, available at www.gnyha.org/9379/File.aspx. 
 149. Id. (citing David Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical 
Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2024–33 (2004)). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. (citing Michelle Mello et al., Health Courts and Accountability for Patient Safety, 84 
MILBANK Q. 459, 459–92 (2006)). 
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already implemented several separate special courts that have 
received positive reaction.152 These courts improve fairness and 
consistency in the system.153 Alternatively, the legislature should 
consider mandatory arbitration to give plaintiffs an incentive to settle 
before going to trial. Proponents of reform say mediation and 
arbitration are preferable because they take the remedy out of the 
hands of the jury, who are more prone to giving higher damage 
awards due to sympathy.154 
CONCLUSION 
The Nestlehutt decision left the Georgia General Assembly 
wondering how to implement safeguards to protect Georgia’s 
physicians from high medical malpractice liability expenses that 
cause a reduction in availability and an increase in the cost of health 
care to citizens of the state.155 Although passing new legislation has 
achieved success in some states, the Georgia Supreme Court 
unanimously ruled caps unconstitutional and noted it would do so 
even if the provision were altered, signaling an unwillingness to 
budge on the issue.156 
 Constitutional amendments are effective because cases like 
Nestlhutt could only be brought in federal courts that have never 
found caps unconstitutional.157 However, due to the current difficulty 
of amending Georgia’s constitution, the legislature should look to 
other tort reform measures beyond caps on noneconomic damages. 
Likewise, a collateral source rule may prove to be another 
constitutional hurdle. Thus, the best solutions for the General 
Assembly are creating a sliding fee system like New York’s and 
                                                                                                                 
 152. See Megan K. Johnson, Business Court Annual Report, FULTON CNTY. SUPERIOR COURT (2011), 
http://www.fultoncourt.org/sca200807/documents-and-forms/doc_view/297-business-court-report-
october-2010.raw?tmpl=component (stating business courts were created in 2005); See Bill Rankin & 
Carrie Teegardin, Drug Court: Saving Money, Saving Lives, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 4, 2012, at A1. 
 153. Johnson, supra note 152, at 2. Through use of judges with specialized knowledge of business 
law, the business court is more time efficient and accurate. Id. 
 154. Harris & Longo, supra note 102, at 66–67, 72–74. 
 155. See discussion supra Introduction. 
 156. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 157. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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improving the dispute resolution system through procedural reforms 
such as creating courts dedicated to malpractice cases or requiring 
arbitration or mediation prior to trial.158 These steps will ensure that 
Georgians have access to affordable health care until further 
legislative solutions can be obtained.  
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 158. See discussion supra Part III.D. 
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